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I. INTRODUCTION
In his first inaugural address, President Franklin Roosevelt
assured the American people that "the only thing we have to fear is
fear itself."1  President Roosevelt's famous statement begs the
question, however, of why we should fear fear itself. What, or whom,
does fear harm? When faced with the presence of fear, society must
consider what steps it is willing to take and what it is willing to give
up in order to address that fear. These considerations become
particularly acute when the government uses the existence of fear as a
rationale for legislation. The propriety of fear-based lawmaking is
questionable, since fear is often unreasonable, malleable, and vague.
2
This debate has recently arisen in the context of state laws that
require individuals to present photo identification in order to vote.
While proponents generally say that identification requirements are
necessary to prevent in-person voter fraud, they have also argued that
such laws are necessary to address voter fear.3 Without photo
identification laws, proponents contend, voters will fear that fraud is
occurring at the polls. Indeed, states have made this argument even in
the absence of any evidence of actual in-person voter fraud.4 In
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Supreme Court
accepted the State of Indiana's argument that addressing fear of fraud
is a state interest with "independent significance" apart from the
interest in halting actual fraud.5 In dicta in Purcell v. Gonzalez, the
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT Il(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
2. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
1-5, 35-61 (2005) (arguing that fear-based lawmaking is faulty because fear is inherently faulty).
3. E.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1620 (2008); Weinschenk
v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 205, 218 (Mo. 2006).
4. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619-20 (recounting the state's contentions that its law
served the interest of safeguarding public confidence but noting that the "record contains no
evidence of any such [in-person] fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time'.
5. Id. at 1620.
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Court likewise expressed approval of laws designed to calm "[v]oters
who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent
ones."
6
The Court has yet to evaluate a voting law that uses fear as a
rationale under heightened scrutiny, as the law in Crawford survived
a deferential level of review. 7 As such, courts have not yet had
occasion to determine if a state's interest in addressing fear of fraud is
compelling. Indeed, courts presently lack an analytical framework for
making such a determination. Yet a challenge that successfully
triggers more exacting scrutiny is foreseeable; indeed, Crawford
provides several hints of the shape such a challenge could take.8
Unless states have significantly greater success than in previous cases
in gathering evidence of in-person voter fraud, they will not be able to
rely upon an interest in addressing actual fraud to survive heightened
scrutiny. As such, the nature of the state's interest in addressing fear
of fraud will likely constitute the major focus of the case.
Fear in the photo ID context is particularly problematic, since
such laws completely deny the right to vote to one group of legitimate
voters-individuals without a photo ID, who are typically indigent,
elderly, or members of minority populations 9-in order to calm the
fears of another group of voters. Measures that ensure confidence in
the electoral system are important, but their salutary effect must be
balanced against the burdens they create. Freedom from fear is not a
fundamental right, but the right to vote is.1° A framework for
evaluating fear-based election laws is thus necessary not simply to
prepare courts for a foreseeable controversy but also, and more
importantly, to safeguard the fundamental right to vote. While this
problem is implicated any time the state uses fear to tighten its voter
requirements, the risk of disenfranchisement is more acute when the
requirement is a photo ID, since such IDs are often particularly
difficult to obtain.11 In addition, states have so far made the fear
argument most prominently in the photo ID context.
Decisions such as Crawford seem to be based on judicial
assumptions that fear is a sufficiently serious harm to serve as a
legitimate target of legislation. To justify their acceptance of voter fear
6. 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam).
7. 128 S. Ct. at 1616, 1623.
8. Id. at 1621 n.19, 1622-23.
9. Brief for Petitioners at 12-13, Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 07-21).
10. E.g., Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (holding
the right to vote fundamental); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (same).
11. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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as a rationale for lawmaking, and for the sake of consistency and
manageability, courts must articulate the legal principles behind such
decisions and establish a generally applicable standard for the
evaluation of such laws. This Note proposes an outline for such a
standard and presents several questions that a court should ask when
evaluating laws that deny or abridge the right to vote based on fear.
Providing definite answers to these questions is beyond the scope of
this Note, as they will often involve quantitative or other factual
information specific to a particular jurisdiction. Nonetheless, pressing
courts to ask these questions is preferable to acquiescing in their
current unguided analysis.
Rather than address an open question and attempt to provide
an answer, this Note instead takes an inquiry at risk of being
answered poorly and unsettles it by asking more questions.
Constitutional theory based on intuition or assumption is troubling,
particularly when those assumptions deal with something as
irrational and malleable as fear and when the fundamental right to
vote is at stake. As such, this Note suggests that the courts step back
and engage in a more probing analysis before intuition calcifies into
doctrine. While "[1]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,"12
it fares little better under answers premised upon faulty conclusions
and unproven assertions.
Part II of this Note first provides background on the process of
evaluating election laws generally, then discusses how courts have
considered the use of fear in the voting context, particularly in cases
involving photo ID laws. Part III discusses the inherent risks of fear-
based lawmaking that affects the right to vote and critiques the
courts' failure to define the nature of the state interest at stake
adequately or to craft a consistent and manageable standard for
analyzing such laws. Finally, Part IV presents a series of questions
that courts should ask, including whether the fear is real, reasonable,
and correlated with a defined and generally recognized harm. While
not an exhaustive list, these three questions are proposed since they
are particularly probative of the nature and strength of the state
interest in addressing fear of fraud. Once a court identifies the
interest at stake, it can more effectively judge the necessity of the
challenged law to serve that interest when balanced against the
burden it places on the right to vote.
12. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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II. VOTING LAWS AND VOTER FEARS
Courts have long recognized that voting is unique and that
laws affecting the right to vote should receive heightened scrutiny.
Voting "is regarded as a fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights."13 Recent decisions affirm this sentiment,
holding that "it is beyond cavil that 'voting is of the most fundamental
significance under our constitutional structure' "14 and describing the
right to vote as "one of the most fundamental rights of our citizens."15
Determining under what circumstances and for what reasons states
can pass laws that restrict this important right, and how courts
should evaluate such laws, is a central inquiry for American
democracy.
A. Evaluating Voting Laws
In a series of cases in the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court
consistently held that voting was a fundamental right safeguarded by
the Equal Protection Clause. 16 Once the state has granted the right to
vote, it cannot arbitrarily abridge or deny that right to a certain group
of otherwise legitimate voters. Generally, any law restricting
fundamental rights is subject to strict scrutiny. 17 However, the
Constitution charges states with setting the "Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,"18 an
authority that necessarily leads to some restrictions on the right to
vote. States can, for instance, establish residency requirements, 19
registration deadlines, 20 or limitations on write-in voting.21 Such
13. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
14. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at
184).
15. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1240 (2009).
16. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) ("In decision after decision, this Court
has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on
an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society.").
17. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Court has held that states have an analogous power to
control the election process for state offices. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,
217 (1986).
19. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343.
20. ACORN v. Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122-23 (D. Conn. 2005).
21. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992).
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measures are necessary to ensure that "some sort of order, rather than
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes."22
Recognizing this necessity, the Court developed a more flexible
framework for evaluating election laws that affect the right to vote.
First articulated in Anderson v. Celebrezze23 and reaffirmed nine years
later in Burdick v. Takushi,24 this framework remains in place today.
Like much judicial analysis, evaluation of election laws consists of a
balancing test. Under Burdick, "the rigorousness of [the court's]
inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the
extent to which a challenged regulation burdens" the right to vote.25
As such, not all laws that affect the right to vote are subject to strict
scrutiny, but rather face a sliding scale of scrutiny. The severity of the
burden determines the level of scrutiny the court will apply to the
"precise interests put forward by the State" and "the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights." 26
If the burden is severe, heightened scrutiny applies and the
state must show that its law is narrowly drawn to support a
compelling state interest. 27 By contrast, if the burden is minimal and
nondiscriminatory, the state need only show that the law is a
reasonable way of accomplishing a "legitimate" interest. 28 At this
lower level of review, akin to traditional rational basis, the court will
typically defer to the judgments of the legislature. 29 While rejecting
the inflexible application of strict scrutiny, the Court nonetheless
22. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
23. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
24. 504 U.S. at 434.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
27. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). While the
Court uses the language of strict scrutiny, some subsequent decisions have described the
heightened scrutiny under Burdick as "strict scrutiny light." E.g., Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., dissenting), affd, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613
(2008).
28. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 440.
29. The Court has never clarified whether the level of review it applies to election laws with
non-severe burdens is actually rational basis or just relatively deferential. Compare Werme v.
Merrill, 84 F.3d 479, 485 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis), with McLaughlin v. N.C. Bd. of
Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1221 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a law without a severe burden
could fail under Burdick even if the "regulation is rational"). See also Brief for Christopher
Elmendorf & Daniel P. Tokaji as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2-3, 7 n.6, Crawford v.
Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (No. 07-21) (noting the uncertainty and
suggesting a "reasonably necessary to important state interests" standard).
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reiterated that " 'precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an
area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.'-30
B. Voter ID Laws and Voter Fears
1. Voter ID Background
Following the 2000 presidential election and the accompanying
confusion in Florida, the mechanics of the electoral system faced
increased scrutiny from the public, the press, and politicians. 31 In
response, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA"), 32 and
various official commissions met and issued reports and
recommendations on improving the system. Although voter fraud was
not one of the major issues in the Florida election, many of the
responses included proposal or enactment of new identification
requirements for voting, including the requirement that voters bring a
photo ID to the polls. HAVA only required first-time voters who had
registered by mail to produce an ID when voting in person and did not
mandate a photo ID.33
One of the more controversial recommendations came from the
Report of the Commission on Federal Election Reform (commonly
known as the Carter-Baker Report, after its two chairmen), which
proposed that states require all voters to present a state-issued photo
ID every time they vote. 34 While most states maintain the HAVA
minimum for ID requirements, Indiana, Georgia, Missouri, and
Florida passed laws requiring photo ID of nearly all in-person voters.3 5
In addition, Michigan, Louisiana, and South Dakota ask for photo ID,
30. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963)).
31. E.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 689-90 (2006) (discussing the "unprecedented" focus on election
administration in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (Supp. 2005).
33. Id. § 15483(b)(1)-(2)(A).
34. COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 21
(2005), available at http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf.
35. State Requirements for Voter ID, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgtelect/
taskfc/voteridreq.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). Each of these states allows voters without a
photo ID to cast a provisional ballot, though Georgia will not count these ballots unless the voter
returns within a set period of time and presents a photo ID and Indiana requires the voter to
return with a photo ID or to sign an affidavit stating that he cannot obtain such an ID either for
religious reasons or because he is indigent. The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law,
Election Law Maps Voter ID Requirements, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/maps/maps.
php?ID=69 (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
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but allow voters without one to cast a regular ballot after signing an
affidavit attesting to their identity.36
2. Constitutional Challenges and the Rise of Fear
Constitutional challenges to such laws met with varying
degrees of success in the lower courts. Plaintiffs argued that photo ID
laws violate equal protection by placing a significant burden on the
fundamental right to vote for certain populations, such as minorities,
the indigent, and the elderly, that are less likely to have a state-issued
photo ID. 37 These challenges contended that the requirements were a
significant burden due to the cost and administrative difficulty of
obtaining such an ID. Courts held that charging a fee for the ID
constituted an impermissible poll tax.38 Even states that offered a free
ID required applicants to present other forms of identifying
documentation such as a passport or a birth certificate, which
themselves cost money to obtain. 39 In addition, securing a copy of a
birth certificate often proved difficult for elderly or homeless voters
who no longer lived in the state of their birth.40 As such, the voters
who lacked a photo ID tended also to lack the means to obtain one. 41
Courts struck down photo ID requirements as violative of equal
protection in Missouri 42 and the city of Albuquerque, 43 and initially
enjoined enforcement of the Georgia law.44 Such requirements were
36. Voter Identification, http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/HAVA-
Map2.pdf (last visited Oct.1, 2009).
37. E.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 12-13. Indeed, Indiana acknowledged that
"seniors and the disabled who live in care facilities would likely have particular difficulty
traveling to obtain photo identification." League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, No.
49A02-0901-CV-40, 2009 Ind. App. LEXIS 1628, at *30 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2009).
38. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1366-70 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
39. E.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621 n.17 (2008).
Although counties in Indiana charged as little as $3-$12 for a copy of a birth certificate, id., the
Supreme Court famously held a $1.50 poll tax unconstitutional in Harper v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664 n.1, 670 (1966).
40. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J.,
dissenting), affld, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
41. Indeed, obtaining a photo ID in Indiana is now even more difficult. A new identity theft
law requires all first-time applicants to present a minimum of four identifying documents in
order to obtain such an ID. Editorial, BMV Headaches Ahead, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETITE, July 15,
2009.
42. Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 221-22 (Mo. 2006).
43. ACLU v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (D.N.M. 2007), rev'd, 546 F.3d 1313
(10th Cir. 2008).
44. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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upheld in Indiana, 45 Michigan,46 Albuquerque (on appeal),47 and,
ultimately, Georgia. 48
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue in the form of an
appeal from an interlocutory injunction order in Purcell v. Gonzalez. 49
The challenged Arizona law required proof of citizenship when
registering and either a photo ID or two non-photo forms of
identification when voting in person.50 While the Court reversed the
injunction upon a finding that the Ninth Circuit's failure to defer to
the discretion of the district court was erroneous, the Court
commented briefly on the merits of the case. 51 The per curiam opinion
noted that Arizona "indisputably" had a compelling interest in
preserving the integrity of its election process against threats like
voter fraud.52 The Court reasoned that fraud "drives honest citizens
out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our
government. '53 The Court then went one step further, stating that
"[v]oters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by
fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised." 54
In a single paragraph concurrence, Justice Stevens stressed the
need to develop an adequate factual record when important
constitutional issues are at stake. The Court must resolve such issues
"on the basis of historical facts rather than speculation."55 In
particular, he noted the lack of factual evidence of either the
"prevalence and character of the fraudulent practices that allegedly
justify" the ID requirement or the "scope of disenfranchisement" that
it would produce. 56
Lower courts and commentators interpreted the Purcell dicta
as implying that a state's interest in addressing fear of fraud may
validly serve as a rationale for legislation. The Michigan Supreme
Court quoted the "feel disenfranchised" language in an advisory
45. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954 (majority opinion).
46. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740
N.W.2d 444, 447-48 (Mich. 2007).
47. ACLU v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1325 (10th Cir. 2008).
48. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009).
49. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
50. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-579 (2008); Purcell, 549 U.S. at 2.
51. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-5.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id.
54. Id.




opinion deeming a state photo ID law constitutional. 57 A federal
district court in Florida refused to enjoin a law that required certain
voters to present a driver's license or Social Security card at the polls
in part because the law was intended to "enhance[] public
confidence."58 Likewise, the Albuquerque City Council listed the need
for "the public to have confidence in the election process" as its first
finding in a resolution proposing a vote on a photo ID law.5 9 Academic
commentary split between praise and condemnation, but both sides
agreed that Purcell could allow states to use fear of fraud as support
for enhanced voter requirements. 60
At least one court expressly rejected this rationale. The
Missouri Supreme Court struck down Missouri's photo ID law despite
the state's assertions that it had a "compelling interest in combating
perceptions of voter fraud" and that such a law was necessary to
"reassure voters who 'perceive' that fraud exists."61 Applying
heightened scrutiny, the court held that the state's interest in
reassuring frightened voters was insufficient to support the law in the
absence of evidence of actual in-person voter fraud. 62
3. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
In the wake of these lower court challenges, the Supreme Court
ruled on the constitutionality of Indiana's photo ID law in Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board.63 Applying the Burdick framework, the
Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the
law's burden on the right to vote was severe. 64 Indeed, the Court held
that the record lacked sufficient evidence for the Court even to
57. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740
N.W.2d 444, 454 (Mich. 2007) (quoting Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4).
58. Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1252 (N.D. Fla.
2008).
59. ACLU v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614 (D.N.M. 2007), rev'd, 546 F.3d 1313
(10th Cir. 2008).
60. E.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder:
The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1737, 1740 (2008) (expressing concern that, post-Purcell, parties had "taken the Court at its
word that combating perceptions of fraud . . . can justify voter identification laws"); Andrew N.
DeLaney, Note, Appearance Matters: Why the State Has an Interest in Preventing the Appearance
of Voter Fraud, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 847, 874 (2008) (arguing that Purcell showed the Court
"leaning toward recognizing the prevention of the appearance of fraud as a compelling state
interest" and praising that development).
61. Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 218-19 & n.29, 205 (Mo. 2006).
62. Id. at 205, 215. For additional discussion of Weinschenk, see infra Part III.A.2.
63. 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (2008).
64. Id. at 1621-23.
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measure the law's burden on the right to vote. 65 As such, the Court
applied a low level of review, requiring only that the law be reasonable
and serve a legitimate state interest.66
Indiana's proffered interests included deterring in-person voter
fraud and safeguarding voter confidence. 67 The Court acknowledged
that the record "contains no evidence of any such fraud actually
occurring in Indiana at any time in its history"68 and instead cited
nineteenth-century Boss Tweed anecdotes and reports from other
jurisdictions 69 as support for the rationality of a photo ID law to meet
Indiana's interest in preventing fraud. Likewise, the Court accepted
with minimal comment Indiana's claim that its interest in
safeguarding voter confidence had "independent significance"
sufficient to support the photo ID law. 70
The assertion that a state has a legitimate interest in
responding to the public's fear of fraud in the electoral process, even in
the absence of evidence of any actual fraud, recalls the Purcell dicta
that voters who fear fraud are in some way disenfranchised. Indeed,
Indiana cited Purcell in its brief for the proposition that its law was
justified as addressing the "perception of corrupt elections."71 Nine
amicus briefs similarly cited Purcell in support of Indiana's ID
requirement. 72 While the Court made no mention of it in the opinion,
Indiana's brief also cited a Rasmussen public opinion poll reporting
the percentage of voters who "believed there was 'a lot' or 'some' fraud
in elections." 73
Under low-level scrutiny, this minimal support underlying
Indiana's interests was sufficient. The Court required neither
65. Id. For instance, the record did not list the number of registered Indiana voters who
lacked ID. Id. at 1622. Further, none of the named plaintiffs could definitively show that they
were unable to acquire a photo ID. Id. The Court held that such scant evidence could not support
a facial challenge, seeking to invalidate the law "in all its applications." Id. at 1621.
66. Id. at 1616, 1623.
67. Id. at 1617.
68. Id. at 1619.
69. Id. at 1619 & nn.11-12. Justice Stevens recounted the perhaps apocryphal instructions
to Boss Tweed's supporters to alternate between the polling place and the barber on Election Day
in order to vote "with their whiskers on .... vote 'em again with the side lilacs and a mustache..
. vote 'em a third time with the mustache [and i]f that ain't enough ... clean off the mustache
and vote 'em plain face." Id. at 1619 n.il.
70. Id. at 1620.
71. Brief for State Respondents at 53, Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (Nos. 07-21, 07-25).
72. See Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 60, at 1740 & n.8 (citing amicus briefs).
73. Brief for State Respondents, supra note 71, at 55.
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empirical evidence nor much theoretical justification.74 Justice Souter,
in dissent, rebuked the majority for failing to make a "careful, ground-
level appraisal.., of the State's reasons for imposing" a burden on the
right to vote, arguing that, even under rational basis, Indiana cannot
support its law simply with "abstract interests" in a smooth electoral
system. 75 Rather, the state must proffer the "precise interests" that
the law is meant to serve. 76
Crawford does not foreclose the possibility that heightened
scrutiny might apply in subsequent challenges to photo ID laws,
however. The decision reflects the Roberts Court's general
unwillingness to entertain facial challenges to election laws, 77 but six
of the Justices intimated that as-applied challenges might meet with
greater success.78 Indeed, the Court suggested at least two parties who
might bring such a challenge: indigents and individuals who have a
religious objection to being photographed. 79 When one such challenge
manages to identify burdens on the right to vote significant enough to
trigger heightened scrutiny, the courts will presumably demand more
explanation from the state as to the nature of its interest in
addressing fear of fraud.80
74. Somewhat ironically, Justice Stevens, who had penned the paean to factual records in
his Purcell concurrence, 549 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring), wrote the majority opinion
in Crawford, accepting Indiana's rationales without much factual support.
75. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1627-28 (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1635 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
77. See generally Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy? The
Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent
Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644-47, 1658-75 (2009) (describing the Roberts
Court's strong preference for as-applied challenges, particularly in the context of election law
controversies).
78. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy in the opinion
that consideration of only the law's "broad application to all Indiana voters" precluded a finding
of a severe burden, Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623, and the three dissenting justices would have
invalidated the law under the present challenge, id. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting). Only
Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas rejected the possibility of an as-applied challenge. Id. at 1625
(Scalia, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 1621 n.19, 1622-23 (majority opinion).
80. The League of Women Voters subsequently brought a successful state court challenge to
the photo ID law the Court upheld in Crawford. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita,
No. 49A02-0901-CV-40, 2009 Ind. App. LEXIS 1628, at *1-5, *44 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2009).
The Indiana Court of Appeals invalidated the law as violative of the state constitution's Equal
Privileges and Immunities Clause on the grounds that the provisions exempting absentee voters
and voters who resided in state licensed health care facilities that also served as polling sites
constituted unreasonable differential treatment. Id. at *22-25, *34-35, *44. The opinion did not
discuss fear of fraud, suggesting that neither party raised the issue. The likely legislative
response would seem to be an expansion of the ID requirement, which is probably not voting
rights advocates' ideal result.
1882
PHOTO IDENTIFICATION LAWS
4. Perceptions Elsewhere in Election Law
a. Campaign Finance
While the Crawford Court's reliance on fear as support for a
law was novel in the voting context, public perception has been used
as a rationale for campaign finance laws since the seminal case of
Buckley v. Valeo.81 In Buckley, the Court announced that the
government's interests in preventing "corruption and the appearance
of corruption" were sufficient to justify limits on campaign
contributions8 2 and that the latter interest was "of almost equal
concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements."8 3 The
Court explained that the appearance of corruption is "inherent in a
regime of large individual financial contributions."8 4
Since Buckley, public opinion polls measuring public
perceptions of corruption have become a regular ingredient in
litigation concerning campaign finance laws.8 5 The Court recently
reaffirmed the validity of reliance on appearances, holding that the
practice was so well established by precedent that the state had only a
minimal burden of justification for such reliance in any given case.8 6
The Court has never expressly stated the level of scrutiny it is
applying in these cases, though no indication exists that the state's
interest in combating the appearance of corruption is sufficiently
compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny.8 7 Similarly, the Court has never
required campaign finance laws to be narrowly tailored to address
actual or apparent corruption.88 Critics of Buckley and its progeny
have attacked such decisions for allowing the government to infringe
First Amendment rights through a scattershot, " 'blunderbuss
approach' " against "vague and unenumerated harms."8 9 Other
81. 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 27.
84. Id.
85. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance:
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 133 (2004).
86. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000).
87. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003) (describing the "less rigorous standard of
review" applied to campaign finance laws).
88. See Persily & Lammie, supra note 85, at 142 (noting that "[tihe Court has emphasized
that campaign reforms need not be 'scalpel-like' in their precision").
89. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 428, 424 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Co. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 642 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part)); see also D. Bruce La Pierre, Campaign Contribution Limits:
Pandering to Public Fears About "Big Money"and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687,
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commentators contend that campaign finance laws intended to
address public suspicions of corruption and restore faith in the system
will ultimately fail to do so since other factors that the laws do not
address contribute to the overall lack of confidence. 90
b. Burdened by Perceptions
Outside of the campaign finance context, courts have displayed
little sympathy towards legal arguments predicated on voter fear. The
state's interest in addressing voter fear of an election system in
shambles is arguably implicit in HAVA, a law enacted in the
aftermath of the 2000 election with the twin aims of making it "easier
to vote and harder to cheat."91 Nonetheless, one lower court
dismissively chided a plaintiff for arguing "without citation.., that
the purpose of HAVA is to give the voters more confidence in the
electoral process." 92 In that case, officers of the Alabama Democratic
Party sought to challenge the appointment of the state's Republican
governor to oversee compliance with HAVA, arguing that the
appointment fostered the perception of partisan control of the
process.93 The court rejected the officers' reliance on the "conclusory
and bald allegation of a mere 'perception,' " since perceptions are
"entirely remote and speculative" in the absence of actual evidence of
partisan manipulation.94
At the appellate level, the Eleventh Circuit rejected an equal
protection claim from Florida voters concerned that their voting
machines would prevent adequate review in the event of a recount. 95
The court refused to apply strict scrutiny, holding that the alleged
burden-"the mere possibility that ... [plaintiffs'] ballots will receive
a different, and allegedly inferior, type of review"-was speculative,
and thus minimal.96
714 (criticizing the use of appearances of corruption as an "amorphous and dangerous standard
for regulating political speech").
90. Persily & Lemmie, supra note 85, at 137-39, 148-50 (contending that "mass perceptions
of corruption derive principally from attitudes unrelated to the problem of undue influence").
91. COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 34, at 2.
92. United States v. Alabama, No. 2:06-cv-392-WKW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55305, at *12
(M.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2006).
93. Id. at *4-5.
94. Id. at *14-15.
95. Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2006).
96. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added). In Crawford and Purcell, the Court suggested that it will
accept voter fear as an interest under the Burdick balancing test. Whether, despite the seeming
unwillingness of the lower courts, voter fear can also qualify as a burden is an important
unanswered question. A voter could challenge an element of the state's election administration,
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In sum, following the Court's apparent approval in Purcell and
Crawford, states may increasingly rely on fear of fraud as a rationale
for passing restrictive voting requirements such as photo ID laws. 97
Since the Court granted its approval without much scrutiny, however,
the use of voter fear as a basis for lawmaking, and as a rationale for
upholding laws, that affect the right to vote is not so well established
as to obviate the need for further analysis and critique. Moreover, the
question of whether the state has a compelling interest in addressing
fear of fraud remains unanswered. As the next Part demonstrates,
substantial risks are inherent in fear-based lawmaking and in
inadequate judicial analysis, especially when such laws deny or
abridge the right to vote.
III. A CRITIQUE OF FEAR-BASED LAWMAKING AND THE COURTS THAT
UPHOLD IT
Although a democratic government must remain responsive to
public opinion, including public fears, the degree of responsiveness
embodied in legislation must be somewhat tempered when rights are
stake.98 In such instances, the state's use of fear as the predominant
rationale for lawmaking should be cabined. Indeed, the Court has held
in other contexts that fear alone is not a valid rationale for
government action.99 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, for
instance, the Court held that a fear-based zoning restriction did not
even satisfy rational basis review. 100 Similarly, courts ought not to
such as the use of voting machines without paper trails, by arguing that it contributes to his lack
of confidence in the integrity of the system. While worth exploring, this intriguing topic is beyond
the scope of this Note.
97. For example, in January 2009, the Rhode Island Secretary of State announced the
introduction of legislation intended to "fight the widespread perception of voter fraud" by
requiring all voters to show a photo ID at the polls. Rhode Island Office of the Secretary of State,
Voter ID & Early Voting Bills Are Introduced, http://www.sec.state.ri.us/elections/news-
items/voter-id-early-voting-bills-are-introduced (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). The proposal is
modeled after the Indiana law upheld in Crawford. Id.
98. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (celebrating the promise of republican
government to "break and control the violence of faction" by deflecting the "temporary or partial
considerations" of a majority that are "adverse to the rights of other citizens"); see also SUNSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 1 (positing that, in a deliberative democracy, "responsiveness is complemented
by a commitment to deliberation, in the form of reflection and reason giving').
99. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985)
(commenting that government action based on "vague, undifferentiated fears" is invalid because
it permits "some portion of the community to validate what would otherwise be an equal
protection violation"); see also Persily & Lammie, supra note 85, at 124 ("Catering to irrational
fears never constitutes a compelling state interest.").
100. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449-50.
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adopt social perceptions such as fear as the central foundation for
constitutional decisions. 10 1 Yet the Crawford Court, shirking its duty
to conduct probing analysis, accepted the state's fear-based rationale
with minimal comment. The unquestioned use of fear to restrict the
right to vote thus constitutes both a legislative and judicial failure.
A. Legislative Failures
In his inaugural address, President Roosevelt warned against
acting pursuant to fear, since fear is often "nameless, unreasoning,
unjustified."'1 2 Reliance on perceptions such as fear is generally a
tenuous rationale for lawmaking. 10 3 Fear is often irrational; it may or
may not have a basis in fact. 10 4 And even if reasonable at one point in
time, fear, like other forms of public opinion, is fickle and malleable;
worse, it is easily manipulable.10 5 Finally, fear is a vague, undefined
harm.
Fear-based lawmaking is particularly misguided when the
fundamental right to vote is at stake. In the photo ID context, the
actual rights of eligible voters who lack an ID are sacrificed to address
the fears of other voters. 10 6 Those individuals who are harmed by
photo ID laws are robbed of the very means by which they can fight
back-participation in the political process. 0 7 Unlike fearful voters
who wish to express their discontent with the state of the electoral
system, voters without IDs can no longer effectively contribute to the
debate over ballot access versus ballot security.
101. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 536 (1993) (warning of the "spectre of legal decisions turning on public opinion surveys"); cf.
Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 675-676 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
petitioners' "[s]ubjective apprehensions and unsupported predictions" as bases for issuing an
injunction).
102. Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 11.
103. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 1-5, 35-61.
104. Chad Flanders, How to Think About Voter Fraud (And Why), 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93,
119-20 (2007).
105. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 94-95, 103.
106. Three commissioners dissented from the Carter-Baker Report's photo ID
recommendation, insisting that "[t]he mere fear of voter fraud should never be used to justify
denying eligible citizens their fundamental right to vote." COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM,
supra note 34, at 89.
107. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258-59 (1962) (noting that the consequences of
malapportionment had left voters with "no 'practical opportunities for exerting their political
weight at the polls' ") (Clark, J., concurring) (quoting MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284
(1948)).
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1. Fear Is Irrational
Fear is often irrational. People may fear something that does
not exist, or they may fear something that does exist
disproportionately to the harm it poses. 108 Professor Cass Sunstein
discusses the frequency of "probability neglect" when fear informs
decisionmaking. 10 9 In this phenomenon, emotion tends to overwhelm
all other factors in the deliberative process, leading fearful individuals
to ignore the probability of whatever they fear actually occurring. 1 0
Accordingly, any government action based on this type of fear will
have a corresponding irrationality. Professor Sunstein explores this
issue in the context of regulatory risk analysis, arguing that
government action based on fear can lead to either "costly
expenditures for little or no gain" or "indifference to real risks." '11
Evidence of in-person voter fraud, the only type of fraud that
photo ID requirements would squarely address, is notoriously scant. 112
Indiana, 113 Georgia, 114 and Missouri1 15 all failed to produce any
evidence of such fraud in support of their respective photo ID laws.116
As such, critics of these laws contend that they are akin to "us[ing] a
108. Flanders, supra note 104, at 119-20.
109. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 39.
110. Id. at 76.
111. Id. at 65.
112. See JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD 7
(2007) (reporting that, "by any measure, voter fraud is extraordinarily rare"). See generally Eric
Lipton & Ian Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007,
at Al.
113. The Court found that "the record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually
occurring in Indiana in any time in its history." Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.
Ct. 1610, 1618-19 (2008).
114. Georgia's secretary of state reported "no documented cases of fraudulent voting" by
individuals who "misrepresent[ed] their identities." Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F.
Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
115. A state elections official testified that "she has not received any reports of voter
impersonation fraud from anywhere in the state." Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 210
(Mo. 2006).
116. Some courts and commentators opine that states cannot effectively discover in-person
fraud without more restrictive ID laws. E.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d
949, 953 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (positing that the lack of election fraud
prosecutions is due to the "extreme difficulty of apprehending a voter impersonator"); Hans A.
von Spakovsky, Disadvantaged Arguments, NAT'L REV., May 20, 2008, http://article.
nationalreview.com?q=OTZmNzViZGJjOThmN2QzNmMzNGNiMmNmODE4MDZhZjk=
("Election officials cannot discover an impersonation if they are denied the very tool needed to
detect it, an identification requirement."). In response, Justice Souter mockingly described such
arguments as "like saying the 'man who wasn't there' is hard to spot." Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at
1637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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sledgehammer to hit either a real or imaginary fly on a glass coffee
table."'117 If the harm was present, the solution was nonetheless
disproportionate to the problem. If no harm existed, all one has
accomplished is breaking a table.
Sometimes the costs of policy decisions influenced by
probability neglect are wasted resources and unnecessary
regulation. 118 The cost in the photo ID context is abridgment of a
fundamental right, since laws that address one group of voters' fear of
fraud that may or may not exist do so at the expense of another group
of would-be voters' actual right to vote. Lawmaking that places a
higher priority on preventing hypothetical harms than protecting
actual rights seemingly adopts William Faulkner's rumination that
"there is a might-have-been which is more true than truth"119 into the
legislative process.
Further, by focusing on what is feared, laws may fail to address
what is actually harmful. For example, the Missouri photo ID law only
addressed in-person voter fraud, of which the state had no evidence.1 20
By contrast, it had no effect on absentee ballot fraud, which had
occurred.12' In such instances, the check of public accountability is
undermined, since Missouri voters "could believe that the new law...
prevented fraud in Missouri elections" when it actually did nothing to
address the only type of fraud that did exist in the state. 22 The
appearance of action to address a perceived problem may cause
individuals to wrongly believe that government has served their
needs, a misperception that could influence their votes.
2. Fear Is Malleable, Manipulable
Fears, particularly when they bear only a tenuous relationship
to fact, are easy to sway. Professor Sunstein explains that a
particularly compelling or vivid depiction of a threatened harm can
heighten public fear of that harm, even if it is unlikely to occur. 123 The
Missouri Supreme Court expressed this concern when it struck down a
117. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 955 (Evans, J., dissenting).
118. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 65, 83-85 (providing examples of instances in which
probability neglect led to wasteful or unnecessary government action).
119. WILLIAM FAULKNER, ABSALOM, ABSALOM! 115 (Vintage 1990) (1936).
120. Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 210.
121. Id. at 204-05, 209-10.
122. Id. at 218.
123 SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 36-38.
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photo ID law in Weinschenk v. Missouri.124 The court worried that
public perceptions were "malleable" and thus not a firm foundation for
lawmaking, warning that "protection of our most precious state
constitutional rights must not founder in the tumultuous tides of
public misperception."'125
Shifting to more invidious dangers, the court further warned
that "the tactic of shaping public misperception could be used ... as a
mechanism for further burdening the right to vote." 126 Parties with an
interest in deterring the types of voters least likely to own a photo ID
have an interest in propagating fears of voter fraud, which they can
fairly easily accomplish through media appearances, publications, and
political speeches. 127 Since individuals tend to be more afraid of
threats they can easily imagine, such actions tend to make an
otherwise remote occurrence seem more likely. 128 Similarly, a law
enacted to address a certain threat can itself promote public
consciousness, and public fear, of that threat. 29 By placing even
isolated incidents of fraud in the public eye, self-interested parties can
foment fear, which in turn serves as the basis for further restrictions.
3. Fear Is an Undefined Harm
While the state's interest in ensuring confidence in the election
system is important, it is also an abstract interest. Fear is not easily
measured. By contrast, Burdick requires the state to articulate the
"precise interests" that it intends a law to serve. 130 Without a defined
harm to target, states cannot ensure that their laws will be effective.
Such laws will invariably be over- or underinclusive.' 31 Other,
narrower measures may sufficiently address voters' fears without
124. Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 218. Since the Missouri Constitution explicitly guarantees
the right to vote, election laws are more likely to be subject to strict scrutiny than under the
Federal Constitution. Id. at 210-11. As such, Weinschenk provides an important example of how
federal courts may evaluate photo ID laws when a Burdick analysis determines that heightened
scrutiny is warranted.
125. Id. at 218-19.
126. Id. at 218.
127. See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text. In his Crawford dissent, Justice Souter
made the related point that "the interest in combating voter fraud has too often served as a cover
for unnecessarily restrictive electoral rules" such as poll taxes. 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 n.32 (2008)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
128. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 36-37.
129. Id. at 104.
130. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 789 (1983)).
131. Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 667 (2007).
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infringing upon the rights of a different group of voters. 13 2 Conversely,
fearful voters may remain fearful; they may realize that photo ID
requirements do nothing to prevent absentee ballot fraud. Or perhaps
their fear stems from something else entirely, such as the type of
voting machinery used. 133 Indeed, one study revealed that voters in
jurisdictions with photo ID laws feared fraud at similar levels as
voters in jurisdictions without such laws. 134 If laws with such a broad
and ill-defined purpose are constitutional, few logical limitations on
government action exist, enabling the state "to enact almost any
constraint on voting that it chooses" in hopes of addressing some
vague harm. 135
4. Substitute Risks
Finally, fear-based decisionmaking can obscure the potential
consequences of the decision. Fearful individuals may be too
singularly focused on the source of their present fear to consider the
big picture. 136 This phenomenon is especially acute when the costs are
not borne by the beneficiaries.1 37 If they believe that a law will
sufficiently address their fear, individuals have little incentive to
consider the other consequences of that law. Deliberation grounded in
fear thus fails to "produce a fair accounting of the universe of
dangers."138
This failure is problematic, as steps undertaken to address
oneharm may create new harms, what Professor Sunstein refers to as
"substitute risks."13 9 The most obvious substitute risk stemming from
132. See id. at 678-80 (positing a series of alternative measures such as signature
comparison, affidavits, and a wider range of possible identifying materials).
133. Cf. Persily & Lammie, supra note 85, at 137 (noting that perceptions of political
corruption may stem from factors other than the perceived risks of undue influence in a system
of campaign contributions).
134. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 60, at 1754-58.
135. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740
N.W.2d 444, 475 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
136. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 14-15 (arguing that laws based on fear seem warranted
only if "we blind ourselves to many aspects of risk-related situations and focus on a narrow
subset of what is at stake").
137. Id. at 207-08. While a photo ID requirement affects all voters, it clearly has a greater
effect on certain generally disadvantaged groups. Ignoring the inequities of such a requirement
because it has some effect on everybody is akin to sincerely adopting the argument that "the
majestic equality of the law, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges," Parents Involved
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 799 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 62-63.
139. Id. at 32. Indeed, Professor Sunstein warns that "precautions against some risks almost
always create other risks." Id. at 53.
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a photo ID law is the disenfranchisement of voters who lack an ID.
Other, less drastic harms may follow as well. When the Court
expressed concern in Purcell v. Gonzalez for voters who "feel
disenfranchised" by their fear of fraud, 140 it failed to acknowledge that
new, empirically unfounded restrictions on the right to vote that fall
disproportionately on certain groups of voters may cause those voters
to feel disenfranchised.1 4 1 Such voters are unlikely to have much
confidence in a system that appears to single them out for harsher
treatment. 42 Even if the government is justified in responding to voter
fear, it quickly faces a no-win situation, as one group will always fear
that their votes have been somehow discounted.
B. Judicial Failures
Despite these concerns, states have engaged in fear-based
lawmaking that restricts the right to vote. As such, the courts must
exercise their institutional duty to protect this right.143 The Court has
long held that it will take a hard look at laws that interfere with the
political process, because such laws will not be sufficiently checked by
that process. 144 Photo ID requirements make voting more difficult for
some voters and impossible for others. Either result indisputably
interferes with participation in the political process; courts need not
quibble over the meaning of "effective exercise of the electoral
140. 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam).
141. Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36 (2007).
142. Id. at 25, 36; see also In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of
2005 PA 71, 479 Mich. 1, 77 (Mich. 2007) (expressing concern for voters who lack a photo ID and
"who fear they will suffer harassment and intimidation through the affidavit challenge process").
Aside from the obvious threats to individual rights, certain structural harms will arguably follow
from photo ID laws that deny the franchise to otherwise legitimate voters. For example, political
allies of these disenfranchised voters face a type of vote dilution, as they are unable to effectively
aggregate their preferences. Overton, supra note 131, at 673-74.
143. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102-
03, 117 (1980) (describing the courts as "comparative outsiders" to the political system and thus
uniquely suited to protect access to that system, and cautioning that the role of safeguarding the
right to vote "cannot safely be left to our elected representatives, who have an obvious vested
interest in the status quo"). Professor Ely quotes Alexander Bickel for the proposition that the
job of guaranteeing access to the political process "will not likely be performed elsewhere if the
courts do no assume it." Id. at 103.
144. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that
"legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation" may warrant heightened scrutiny).
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franchise"'145 when an individual lacks access to the ballot box. 146 For
the reasons discussed in Part III.A, a hard look is especially
warranted for fear-based restrictions. 147  Yet courts that have
evaluated such restrictions have generally foregone probing analysis
of either the law or the perceptions driving its passage. 148
The initial shortcoming of courts faced with the novel
argument that states can invoke public fears to restrict the right to
vote has been their failure to cogently identify the nature of the harm
in a fearful electorate. Without identifying the harm of voter fear,
courts cannot effectively determine whether the state's interest in
addressing it is compelling, or even rational, and thus a valid basis for
lawmaking under Burdick. Despite the state's repeated references to
voter confidence at the Crawford oral argument, the Justices never
sought an explanation of the nature of this interest; the only question
from the bench on the subject was Justice Souter's offhand inquiry
into whether the threat to confidence may have come from a source
other than the lack of an ID requirement. 149 In its opinion, the Court
adopted Indiana's argument that fear of fraud undermines "the
integrity and legitimacy of representative government" without
explaining why fear denigrates electoral integrity. 50 In Purcell, the
Court expressed its concern for fearful voters who "feel
disenfranchised," but likewise offered no explanation of what feeling
disenfranchised means or why such feelings are sufficiently bad to
145. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S.
461, 479 (2003) (admitting that "we have never determined the meaning of 'effective exercise of
the electoral franchise'" (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 141)).
146. See Flanders, supra note 104, at 149 ('The person is harmed simply by not being able to
cast a ballot- not the ability to cast a meaningful or effective ballot, but purely by not being able
to cast a ballot."); Tokaji, supra note 31, at 719 (explaining that restrictive voter requirements
like photo ID laws "implicate the value of participation, and not merely the value of
aggregation").
147. The Court reviewed one such restriction in Carrington v. Rash, invalidating a provision
of the Texas Constitution that denied the right to vote in state elections to military personnel
stationed in Texas. 380 U.S. 89, 89 & n.1, 96-97 (1965). Texas passed the law out of concern that
the soldiers would vote as a bloc and overwhelm the preferences of the local civilian population.
Id. at 93. The Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the right to vote "cannot
constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a particular group of
bona fide residents." Id. at 94.
148. Sometimes the court itself seems to fear fraud. See, e.g., Ohio Republican Party v.
Brunner, 544 F.3d 711, 734 (6th Cir. 2008) (Moore, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
basing its decision on an "unsubstantiated fear" of voter fraud if it failed to uphold a temporary
restraining order), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 5 (2008).
149. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct.
1610 (2008) (Nos. 07-21, 07-25).
150. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1620.
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warrant legislation, especially legislation that results in at least some
degree of actual disenfranchisement. 151
Some courts and commentators have sought to define the harm
of voter fear by focusing variously on the power of appearances,
expansive conceptions of vote dilution, or analogies to campaign
finance laws. Others seem to rest solely on intuition or an assumption
that fear is a harm worth addressing. As this Section demonstrates,
however, none of the rationales intimated by courts or suggested by
commentators satisfactorily explain the state's interest in addressing
fear of fraud.
1. Shaw Redux: The Return of Expressive Harms?
Admittedly, fear of fraud seems like a bad thing, though in the
same way that the bizarrely shaped congressional district in Shaw v.
Reno 52 seemed like a bad thing: in both cases, offensive appearances
allegedly constituted harms. Shaw held that white voters in North
Carolina had stated an equal protection claim when they brought suit
against the state for considering race when drawing congressional
districts. 53 The decision rested in significant part on the fact that the
challenged majority-minority district had a bizarre appearance that
suggested an improper racial gerrymander. 154 Indeed, the Court
explained its holding by asserting that "reapportionment is one area
in which appearances do matter."'155
Shaw thus seemed to recognize a new type of constitutional
voting rights claim, in which a district violates equal protection if
"government appears to use race ... in a way that subordinates all
other relevant values."'156 A voter is harmed if he perceives the
drawing of the district as an impermissible use of race, regardless of
whether the government actually used race impermissibly. 15 7
Professors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi described these new
151. See Hasen, supra note 141, at 36 (criticizing Purcell for providing "no explanation why it
is appropriate to balance feelings of disenfranchisement against actual disenfranchisement").
152. 509 U.S. 630, 635-36 (1993).
153. Id. at 658.
154. Id. at 633-34, 644.
155. Id. at 647; see also id. at 641 ("It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan
resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past.") (emphasis added).
156. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 509 (1993).
157. See id. at 508 & n.92 ('The quest is not for the intent or purpose behind legislation ....
What matters is the social message [it] conveys ....").
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claims as "expressive harms."'15 They explained Shaw by casting the
harm of the district as government action that failed to take sufficient
account of societal values; the shape of the district offended the
communal universe of norms, what Professors Pildes and Niemi called
the "nomos."'159
The arguments in support of photo ID laws seem to cast fear of
fraud as a type of "expressive harm."1 60 If voters can be harmed by
appearances, states are justified in enacting legislation in response to
those appearances. As in the early readings of Shaw, the willingness
of courts to accept fear of fraud as the rationale for photo ID laws
"ultimately rests on judicial concerns for social perceptions."'1 61 Courts
that uphold fear-based photo ID laws focus on what the electoral
system looks like to voters.1 62 Just as a strange-looking district
suggests an improper gerrymander regardless of legislative intent, an
electoral system that appears to enable fraud harms voters whether or
not fraud occurs. Proponents of photo ID laws could also argue that
the government's failure to address fear of fraud would offend the
nomos, exhibiting an insufficient level of respect for the citizenry's
sense of confidence in the electoral system.
However, subsequent districting cases made clear that
offensive shapes were only evidence of a harm, not the harm itself. 63
The Court explicitly rejected a reading of Shaw as holding that "in
certain instances a district's appearance ... can give rise to an equal
protection claim" or that "bizarreness is a necessary element of the
constitutional wrong."'164 These cases clarified that the harm identified
in Shaw was the government's actual predominant use of race, 165
which courts have long held is inherently suspect and thus subject to
strict scrutiny. 66 The shape of the district was just one piece of
evidence that helped prove the state's actual race-based intent.1 67
158. Id. at 485.
159. Id. at 507-08.
160. Id. at 507.
161. Id. at 536.
162. See Flanders, supra note 104, at 115 (charging that courts concerned with structural
concepts like electoral integrity "are making choices and assumptions about what a healthy
democracy should look like").
163. E.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912-13 (1995).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 904-05.
166. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
167. E.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 917 (invalidating a bizarrely shaped district but noting the
existence of "considerable additional evidence showing that the General Assembly was motivated
1894 [Vol. 62:6:1871
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After all, the Court did not invalidate equally bizarrely shaped
majority-white districts in the absence of evidence that their creation
was racially motivated. 168
By affirming that Shaw was a more traditional equal
protection race case, the Court rejected the interpretation that bizarre
districts violated the Constitution because they were expressive
harms. Further, the Court associated bizarre districts with a defined
harm and an established analytical framework. 169 Appearances were
not, ultimately, an independent harm that offended society's
normative sensibilities. As such, making voters comfortable with the
shapes of districts was not an interest with "independent
significance."1 70 In order to legitimately accept addressing fear of
fraud as a permissible goal, courts must likewise rely on more than
social perceptions to define the harm.
2. Only One Side of the Ledger
Nor can fear of fraud reasonably be cast as a form of
quantitative vote dilution, one of the major harms recognized in voting
rights law.' 71 When in-person voter fraud actually occurs, an
argument can be made that "the right to vote is on both sides of the
ledger"' 72 when evaluating a photo ID law. Proponents of this view
cast voter fraud as a form of vote dilution, in which legitimately cast
votes are worth less due to the presence of fraudulent votes. 73 As
by a predominant, overriding desire to assign black populations to .. .permit the creation of a
third majority-black district") (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1374-78 (S.D. Ga.
1994)).
168. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1019-20 & n.18 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(contending that the existence of numerous equally bizarrely shaped districts based upon
political, rather than racial, gerrymandering suggests that appearance is "largely irrelevant").
169. Admittedly, the framework for equal protection districting claims is not entirely
equivalent to typical equal protection claims; a districting plan is subject to strict scrutiny only
when race is the "predominant factor" in its passage, Miller, 515 U.S. at 916, while laws outside
of this context are subject to strict scrutiny when race is a "motivating factor," Arlington Heights
v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977). Nonetheless, predominant factor is an
articulated framework (even if one difficult to administer).
170. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1620 (2008).
171. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 568 (1964) (holding that "the right of suffrage
can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise").
172. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 128 S.
Ct. 1610 (2008).
173. Id. at 952; see also Attorney General Michael Mukasey, Remarks at Ballot Access and
Voting Integrity Symposium (July 2, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2008/ag-
speech-0807027.html ("[I]f some voters engage in fraud, . . . that dilutes the voting rights of all
legitimate voters."). This argument is far from universally accepted, and assuredly has its critics.
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such, a photo ID law may disenfranchise voters without an ID, but
failure to pass an ID law dilutes votes by enabling fraud. Since both
results abridge the right to vote, neither is a worse harm; the state
can decide how best to strike a balance.
When the target is fear of fraud, however, this argument loses
much of its force. A legitimate vote has the same weight, regardless of
the psychology of the voter. Without the risk of vote dilution, the state
is no longer balancing two arguably equal harms. Yet in its discussion
of voters who "feel disenfranchised," the Purcell Court seemingly fails
to recognize the disparity in value between a fearful vote and no vote
at all. The Court cites cases involving actual disenfranchisement as
support for the proposition that voters who fear fraud suffer the harm
of feeling disenfranchised, 174 blurring the line between the two and
thus legitimizing the latter by association. Professor Michael Dorf
worries that this association enables the Court to take the position
that "hypothetical feelings of disenfranchisement based on
hypothetical worries about voter fraud somehow count as actual
disenfranchisement."'175 If the specter of a harm that may or may not
exist does not lead to vote dilution, it cannot have much weight when
compared with actual deprivation of the right to vote.
76
3. Campaign Finance: An Imperfect Analogy
Other commentators analogize to the campaign finance
context, contending that fear of fraud is the same type of harm as the
appearance of corruption.177 The commentators who make this analogy
refer to voter fear as the "appearance of fraud."'78 Yet the concept of
an "appearance of fraud" makes no sense. Campaign contributions
See, e.g., Pamela Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 743, 765 (2007) (criticizing the both sides of the ledger argument as a "breathtaking
expansion of the concept of vote dilution").
174. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(quantitative vote dilution) and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (disenfranchisement)).
175. Michael Dorf, In a Brief, Unsigned New Opinion, The Supreme Court Sends the Wrong
Signal on Voter ID and Voter Fraud, FINDLAw'S WRIT, Nov. 6, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.
com/dorf/20061106.html.
176. Cf. David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of
the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 530 ("If one pits an
unproven or unsubstantiated government interest against a demonstrated burden, the weight
assigned to the interest has to be nearly zero.").
177. E.g., DeLaney, supra note 60, at 847-51. Likewise, Indiana almost exclusively cited
campaign finance cases as support for its proposition that its ID law was necessary to preserve
public confidence. Brief for State Respondents, supra note 71, at 53-55.
178. DeLaney, supra note 60, at 858-59.
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lead to an appearance of corruption because a contribution followed by
a vote friendly to the source of that contribution looks like corruption
whether it actually is or not. This appearance is "inherent"1 79 in the
system because determining whether an actual quid pro quo has
occurred is a difficult, chicken-or-the-egg inquiry: Did the contributor
give money because the politician supports his positions, or did the
politician support his positions because he contributed?180 The
appearance of corruption exists when one knows that a financial
contribution was made and who made it, yet cannot tell whether it
had a corrupting effect.' 8 ' This uncertainty stems from the fact that
the existence of corruption is hard to prove or disprove, even when one
has all the relevant information.
By contrast, fear of fraud stems from not knowing who is voting
or whether a fraudulent ballot was cast. Thus, one cannot logically
discuss an "appearance of fraud" in the way the Court described it in
the campaign finance cases. If one knew the identity of each voter,
uncertainty as to the legitimacy of the votes would no longer exist.
Similarly, while the analysis in Buckley suggested that each
contribution is inherently suspect, 8 2 not even proponents of photo ID
laws suggest that every vote that is cast is potentially fraudulent.
Fear of fraud is simply not "inherent" in a system of elections the way
fear of corruption inheres in a system of private political funding.
Further, while studies on whether large contributions actually
lead to corruption have failed to reach a consensus, 8 3 research on in-
person voter fraud consistently concludes that such fraud rarely, if
ever, occurs.18 4 Because of these distinctions, the analogy to campaign
finance laws and Buckley is necessarily imperfect. A state's concern
179. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam).
180. Cf. La Pierre, supra note 89, at 714 ("[I]f a presumption of corruption arises from the
mere fact that a public official votes in a way that pleases contributors, then 'legislatures could
constitutionally ban all contributions except those from . . . [an] official's opponents, a patent
absurdity.' " (quoting Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1998)) (alteration in
original)).
181. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28 (discussing the risks "inherent in a system permitting
unlimited financial contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and the amounts
of their contributions are fully disclosed").
182. Id.
183. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 394-95 (2000) (identifying competing
studies with conflicting results on the issue).
184. See Ian Urbina, U.S. Panel is Said to Alter Finding on Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
11, 2007, at Al (describing a report prepared for the Election Assistance Commission finding
"widespread but not unanimous agreement that there is little polling place fraud"); see also
LEVITT, supra note 112, at 7 (reporting that, "by any measure, voter fraud is extraordinarily
rare").
20091 1897
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:6:1871
with the perception of fraud is simply different in kind than its
concern with the perception of corruption. 8 5
4. Assumptions
In the absence of a defined harm, all that remains for judges to
rely upon is their own intuition or assumptions. Fear seems bad, so
the state must have an interest in addressing it. Courts perhaps posit
that fear is generally an unpleasant sensation-no one wants to be
afraid. According to Professor Terry Maroney, however, such
''emotional common sense" can make for a "potentially unstable
partner with law" due to its necessarily subjective nature.18 6 Indeed,
the Court has rejected such reliance in other areas of the law. 8 7
This reliance on judicial intuition is of no use, and may in fact
do harm, unless it can be clearly articulated as a legal principle.188
Such articulation is necessary both to justify courts' acceptance of
voter fear as a rationale and to ensure consistency and manageability.
Otherwise, courts that evaluate laws enacted to address voter fear will
continue to proceed through an unguided analysis, and judicial
impulse may "degenerate into ... a manipulable tool." 18 9 Just as
public perception is often fickle or malleable, analysis based on a
judge's intuition risks inconsistent and subjective decisions. 190
185. Ultimately, campaign finance laws are also less restrictive than photo ID requirements;
they do not prevent any given individual from participating at all, only regulate how much he
can participate.
186. Terry Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851,
859 (2009).
187. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (invalidating as violative of the
Confrontation Clause a state law allowing child victims of sexual abuse to testify behind a screen
and refusing to rely upon the state's "legislatively imposed presumption of trauma" in such
situations); cf. Williams v. Planned Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133, 1135
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the "'emotional upset' justification" for limits on abortion
clinic protests). In these cases, the Court has determined that "such rights are not to be abridged
on the basis of supposition as to their emotional impact on others." Maroney, supra note 186, at
909.
188. Cf. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 156, at 485 (insisting that the impulse behind Shaw
must be "transformed into legal principles that courts . . . can apply with at least some
consistency and certainty").
189. Id.
190. See Richard Hasen, Op-Ed., A Voting Test for the High Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
2007, at A23 (comparing the partisan affiliation of judges with their votes in ID cases and
concluding that, even if not in an intentional attempt to favor one party, "judges come to these
cases with the same partisan worldviews as the rest of us about the credibility of voter fraud and
vote-suppression claims"); cf. Maroney, supra note 186, at 867 (arguing that analysis based on
"common sense often ... will signal a person's appraisal of the specific attributes of a situation
as it relates to her own beliefs, goals, and values"). The inconsistent treatment of public
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Further, courts cannot meaningfully measure a state's interest in an
assumed harm when balancing such an interest against burdens on
the right to vote under Burdick. Heightened scrutiny demands more
than a state interest that seems compelling.
The absence of meaningful judicial review of fear-based voting
laws creates the risk of a flurry of restrictions on the right to vote,
passed to serve an abstract interest and upheld under a standardless
analysis. To guard against this outcome, the next Part proposes a
series of questions that should form at least the initial basis of a
judicial framework for evaluating the nature and strength of a state's
interest in addressing fear of fraud.
IV. MORE THAN FEAR ITSELF: AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR FEAR-
BASED VOTER ID LAWS
When evaluating a fear-based law that restricts the right to
vote, courts must ask more questions. The application of low-level
scrutiny in Crawford perhaps excuses the lack of inquiry, 191 but
heightened scrutiny surely demands more probing analysis. This
demand stems from both the generally greater strictures of
heightened scrutiny and the fact that the use of fear as rationale in
the voting context is new, given the Court's command that "[t]he
quantum of ... evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny
of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty ... of
the justification raised.'1 92
The courts must craft an analytical framework to determine
when the state's interest in addressing fear of fraud is sufficiently
compelling to survive heightened scrutiny. Such a framework is
necessary both to provide courts with a generally applicable standard
of analysis for future cases and to safeguard the right to vote. Further,
adequate judicial analysis provides a greater likelihood that a law
perceptions in the voting context is further evidence of the need for an articulated framework.
See supra Part II.B.4.b.
191. But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448-49 (1985) (laws
based on fear fail even rational basis).
192. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000), quoted in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1642 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting). Some courts and
commentators have argued that the state has no duty to provide evidence in support of its
interests. In its decision upholding Georgia's photo ID law, the Eleventh Circuit cited Anderson,
Burdick, and Crawford for this proposition. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340,
1353 (11th Cir. 2009). However, Burdick, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992), and Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at
1623 (majority opinion), applied low level scrutiny, so the states were able to win without much
evidence; in Anderson, the Court invalidated an Ohio law under heightened scrutiny, 460 U.S.
780, 806 (1983), so perhaps Ohio should have provided some supporting evidence.
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that is upheld will be regarded as legitimate by those voters whom it
disadvantages and their allies. In order to measure the validity of the
state interests behind a fear-based election law properly, courts should
start by asking three questions: (1) Is the fear real? (2) Is the fear
reasonable? and (3) Does the fear correlate with the occurrence of a
separate, recognized harm? The first two questions stem from the
commonsense notion that the state's interest in responding to
something that does not exist or is unreasonable cannot be
compelling. 193 The third question tracks the post-Shaw districting
cases, working to shape impulse into an articulable standard of
analysis by associating appearances with a more concrete harm.
While not an exhaustive list, these questions will assist the
court in conducting a properly informed application of the Burdick test
and ruling on a law's validity. This Part examines these questions in
greater detail, addresses some of the issues that will arise in the
course of the inquiry, and explains why they must be asked and
sufficiently answered.
A. Is the Fear Real?
The state cannot have a compelling interest in addressing fear if
no one is afraid. 194 Whether fear of fraud exists should be the easiest
of the three questions to answer, though perhaps not quite as easy as
proponents of photo ID laws believe. While surveys tend to reveal a
general lack of confidence in the electoral system, 195 not all of these
surveys measure public opinion on in-person voter fraud. Indeed, the
authors of one such survey reported that when the researchers used
the general phrase "vote fraud," participants said they believed it
occurred frequently, but when the researchers asked instead about
specific conduct that would constitute fraud, like voting multiple
times, participants' belief in its occurrence was lower.196
In addition to public opinion polls, the state could provide
media reports of fraud as support for the proposition that the public is
193. See Persily & Lammie, supra note 85, at 124 ("Catering to irrational fears never
constitutes a compelling state interest."). Courts conduct these analyses in other areas of the
law. See infra notes 194, 200 and accompanying text.
194. Cf. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 390-91, 393-94 (evaluating the evidence offered by the state to
show the existence of a perception of corruption among voters). The parties in Nixon debated the
strenuousness of the state's evidentiary obligation, but not whether it had one. Id. at 390-92.
195. E.g., JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: How VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR
DEMOCRACY 11 (2004) (stating that "the picture ... polls draw is one of suspicion and cynicism").
196. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 60, at 1747.
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sufficiently aware of voter fraud to fear it.197 Heavy focus on even one
isolated incident may give the impression that such fraud is
widespread and endemic. 198 The fact that a state legislature passed a
photo ID law suggests that at least the lawmakers believed that in-
person fraud was a problem, and the legislature ostensibly reflects
public opinion. 199 Legislative history to this effect may thus serve as
relevant evidence of the existence of fear. Whatever form the evidence
takes, it ought to be jurisdiction-specific. If the state can show that
fear of fraud is real, it will satisfy the threshold question as to
whether its interest in addressing that fear is compelling.
B. Is the Fear Reasonable?
If the state is able to show that the fear of fraud is real, the
court should then ask whether that fear is sufficiently reasonable to
warrant legislation. The reasonableness of fear in a given situation is
a notoriously difficult question to answer effectively and fairly, yet it
is one which courts have dealt with before in other contexts. 200
If fear is not reasonable, the state is unlikely to have a
compelling interest in addressing it. When the public fears something
that does not exist, the state arguably has a greater interest in
"combating the false perception, not in catering to it."201 One
commentator has insisted that voter fear must be "warranted" and
"grounded in something besides merely the feeling[]" itself before it
197. See DeLaney, supra note 60, at 869-70, 872 (noting that "[t]here are ample newspaper
stories... that could allow people to infer that the voting system is corrupt").
198. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 36-38 (discussing the "availability heuristic" which
increases the level of fear associated with risks which are readily conceivable, such as those that
receive "considerable media attention").
199. The more cynical view, of course, is that state legislators pass such laws for the sake of
partisan advantage, believing that the ID requirements burden would-be Democratic voters.
E.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J.,
dissenting), afl'd, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (2008).
200. E.g., Guzman v. INS, 327 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding an immigration judge's
determination that petitioner's evidence "fell short of establishing his fear" of persecution if
deported to his home country "was objectively reasonable"); United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d
663, 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (deciding de novo that a police officer had an "objectively
reasonable" fear of possible danger supporting his decision to stop and frisk defendant); see also
People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 111-13 (N.Y. 1986) (considering whether a defendant's fear of an
attack with deadly force must be objectively or subjectively reasonable to support acquittal on
the grounds of self-defense).
201. Flanders, supra note 104, at 119-20; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 226 (arguing
that democratic governments should pass laws that "reduce, and do not replicate, the errors to
which fearful people are prone").
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can serve as the basis for lawmaking. 20 2 Even Professors Pildes and
Niemi, in their discussion of the expressive harm theory, recognized
that courts should only credit "relevant social perceptions." 20 3 In order
to be relevant, perceptions must reflect "acceptance of governing law"
and "awareness of relevant general facts."20 4 In the election context,
the governing law is the right to vote; the franchise simply cannot be
taken away arbitrarily. The relevant general facts for evaluating fear
of fraud would certainly include whether fraud is actually occurring.
And as discussed in Part III.A.1, evidence of in-person voter fraud is
rare.
Whether fear, like any other subjective experience, is
reasonable is often a normative question, however. Fear caused by low
levels of fraud may not necessarily be unreasonable. Such fear may
result not from an irrational understanding of the facts, but rather
from a value judgment that even one fraudulent vote undermines the
entire system. 20 5 In the related debate over the validity of photo ID
laws passed to address actual fraud, some commentators emphasized
the need for additional empirical evidence before courts could make
informed decisions,20 6 while others pushed for greater analysis of
norms. 20 7 Both views stem from the same impulse that courts must
seek out more information and must conduct a more probing analysis.
The reasonableness of fear of fraud may depend upon the
likelihood that such fraud is currently occurring undetected. Courts
should thus look to the legal landscape of the relevant jurisdiction. If
the state has other safeguards in place, such as substantial criminal
liability for voter impersonation 208 or identification requirements that
do not involve photo IDs, 20 9 the fear of fraud is less likely to be
202. Flanders, supra note 104, at 119.
203. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 156, at 536.
204. Id. at 536-37.
205. Flanders, supra note 104, at 104-06.
206. Overton, supra note 131, at 634-37.
207. Flanders, supra note 104, at 108. For a compelling argument that even one instance of
disenfranchisement normatively outweighs enabling the risk of low-level fraud, see id. at 146,
148-49.
208. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972) (noting, after striking down a one-year
residency requirement, that the state "has at its disposal a variety of criminal laws that are more
than adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be feared"). Each act of fraud in a federal
election is punishable by up to five years in prison and a $10,000 fine. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973i(c), (e)
(2000). State law typically provides additional penalties. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-107
(Supp. 2008); id. § 40-35-111(b)(4) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (defining illegal voting as a Class D
felony, punishable by two to twelve years in prison or a $5,000 fine).
209. Currently, twenty-five states require some form of identification above the HAVA
minimum; accepted forms of non-photo ID include Social Security cards, utility bills, and bank
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reasonable. Courts should also consider evidence of other factors in
the electoral system that might increase the risk of fraud. The
presence of inflated voter rolls or old-fashioned voting equipment may
support a finding of reasonableness. 210 Finally, evidence of other forms
of voter fraud or historical occurrences of in-person fraud may have
some relevance, though courts should remain cognizant that the
challenged law would not address these risks.
Based on this record, the court can ask whether a reasonable
voter in the jurisdiction would fear fraud. While the survey of the
jurisdiction's laws and practices proposed above is mostly factual, it
may also inform the normative analysis. Due to legal and historical
distinctions, the reasonable voter in a city with a tradition of clean
elections may have a different normative judgment regarding fraud
than the reasonable voter in Memphis or Chicago.
C. Is the Fear Correlated with an Independently Recognized Harm?
This is one instance in which, with apologies to President
Roosevelt, we must have something more to fear than fear itself. The
state's interest in addressing fear of fraud may have "independent
significance" from the interest in deterring actual fraud, 211 but it
cannot constitute a compelling interest independent of any other
harm.212
An analogy to the districting cases is again helpful. Once the
Court clarified that Shaw was a race case rather than a novel claim
based on appearances and social perceptions, 213 the decision gained a
greater degree of legitimacy. Assuredly, Shaw still had its critics, but
it stood on firmer ground. 214 So, too, must the courts determine
statements. State Requirements for Voter ID (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
legismgt/elect/taskfc/voteridreq.htm.
210. Cf. Crawford v Marion County Election Bd. 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1619-20 (2008) (accepting
as support for Indiana's photo ID law the fact that the state voter rolls contained the names of
thousands of ineligible voters).
211. Id. at 1620.
212. As recounted in Part II.B, supra, proponents of photo ID laws have failed to adequately
explain why fear of fraud is itself a harm requiring legislative redress.
213. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
214. Indeed, the nature of the dissents changed. While Justice White's dissent in Shaw
focused on his belief that "appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they have
not alleged a cognizable injury," 509 U.S. 630, 659 (1993) (White, J., dissenting), dissents in the
subsequent districting cases were more general disagreements with applying the same standard
for governmental use of race to enhance majority power as for the use of race to limit majority
power, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1011 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
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whether fear of fraud correlates with a separate, independently
recognized harm. If such a correlation exists, the state interest behind
the law becomes clearer and more easily measured against the
burdens placed on the right to vote.
Admittedly, a state need not always wait for a harm to
materialize before taking action to address it.215 As such, although
courts should consider whether the correlative harm has already
occurred, its absence will not be dispositive. If fear of fraud has not yet
led to an independent harm, the court should evaluate the likelihood
of that harm's future occurrence based on theoretical and, perhaps,
empirical analysis in the context of the jurisdiction. As part of its
Burdick balancing test, courts should measure the relative immediacy
of the harm to be avoided and of the burdens created by the actions
taken to avoid it.216 In previous opinions, the Court has emphasized
that states can sometimes take preemptive action in response to
potential threats to the electoral system, "provided that the response
is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally
protected rights."21 7 This limit ensures that the state's action at least
be in anticipation of some identified harm.
1. Fear and Turnout in America
Some decisions and commentators suggest that fear of fraud
will drive legitimate voters out of the electoral process.218 Depressed
participation rates are a tangible harm that the government has a
strong interest in preventing. While participation in the electoral
process is not mandatory, federal and state statutes and a variety of
court decisions strongly suggest that it is a value the nation respects.
creation of majority-minority districts is "simply... not the sort of despicable practice that has
been taken in the past to exclude minorities from the electoral process").
215. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986) (expressing the belief
that states "should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with
foresight rather than reactively").
216. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
217. Munro, 479 U.S. at 195.
218. E.g., Crawford v Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1620 (2008) (implying
this correlation by stating that "public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process ...
encourages citizen participation"); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam) ('Voter
fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process .. "); see also FUND, supra note 195, at
2 (asserting that suspicion of the electoral system 'lowers voter participation"). But see
Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 60, at 1750 (describing the correlation between fear of fraud
and participation as "a novel conjecture within the academic research on voter turnout").
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Many federal219 and state220 policies contain the stated goal of
encouraging citizens to vote. Similarly, Professor John Hart Ely has
argued that courts often play a "representation-reinforcing" role by
ensuring access to the political process. 221
As such, if states can prove a correlation between fear of fraud
and depressed turnout, photo ID laws might survive heightened
scrutiny. Unlike Purcell's equation of feeling disenfranchised with
actual disenfranchisement, the effect on the right to vote can more
legitimately be characterized as falling on both sides of the ledger.222
Proving this correlation will not be an easy task, however.
From both a theoretical and empirical standpoint, fear of fraud does
not necessarily lead to decreased turnout among fearful voters.
Indeed, a fearful voter may instead proceed to the polling place with
an even greater determination to fight back against the threat of
fraudulent votes deciding an election. Since no conclusive answers
exist and both results are possible, courts should ask the question.
a. Theoretical Analysis
While ultimately unlikely, the existence of an inverse
correlation between fear and turnout is certainly conceivable. In an
opinion upholding HAVA's ID requirement for first-time voters who
registered by mail, a federal district court in Ohio spelled out the
scenario of voters who, due to fear that their legitimate votes will not
count, "conclude that voting does not matter" and as a result "decline
to exercise the franchise."223 While the court failed to cite any evidence
supporting the actual occurrence of this scenario, it at least developed
219. See, e.g., National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(a)(1)-(2) (2000) (finding
that voting is a fundamental right and "it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local
governments to promote the exercise of that right"). Indeed, the NVRA was enacted "to establish
procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote." Id. §
1973gg(b)(1).
220. Among the many state efforts to boost voter participation, of note is the work of then-
Ohio Secretary of State (now U.S. Senator) Sherrod Brown, who convinced McDonald's to print
voter registration forms on their paper tray liners. Sherrod Brown, Mechanisms for
Participating, in THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AMERICAN VOTER RE-VISITED 60, 61 (1990).
221. ELY, supra note 143, at 101-02.
222. Ironically, Judge Posner, the author of the Seventh Circuit Crawford opinion, 472 F.3d
949 (2007), might well not consider this effect on turnout a legitimate harm. He felt that a photo
ID requirement was not a significant burden, because individuals who do not obtain an ID
merely "disfranchise themselves." Id. at 952. Presumably, he would have a similar opinion of
voters who do not vote because they fear fraud.
223. League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, 340 F. Supp. 2d 823, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
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the theoretical idea; voters who are deterred from voting do more than
"feel disenfranchised." 224
This reasoning follows a "demoralization" theory of voter
deterrence. 225 Social scientists have long puzzled over why people vote,
since the odds of any one particular vote deciding an election are quite
low. 226 If voting is already seen as a relatively useless endeavor, the
realization that one's legitimate vote could be cancelled out by a
fraudulent vote may tip the scales in favor of staying home on Election
Day. Alternatively, fear of fraud may lead to lower turnout because
voters exhibit "disgust for a corrupt system" that enables such fraud to
occur.227 Voters who disrespect the system will not want to associate
themselves with it. This theory of non-participation recalls the
reasoning in the campaign finance cases, in which the Court held that
a system stained with the "perception of impropriety" would
"jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance." 228
Yet such a result does not necessarily follow. Even if turnout
declines, the drop-off can be explained by a variety of other factors.
Voting is a classic collective-action problem, a communal cause with
limited tangible individual benefits. 229 As such, some individuals will
decide to leave the job of participating in elections to others. 230 Would-
be voters may dislike the candidates, not know the issues, or not care
about the outcome. Institutional barriers such as early registration
deadlines, inconvenient polling sites, or even photo ID requirements
may make voting seem not worth the effort. 23 1 In any of these
scenarios, the presence or absence of fear of fraud is irrelevant to the
decision whether to vote.
Further, fear does not undermine many of the potential
benefits of voting. If people still vote even with the full knowledge that
the instrumental value of that vote toward the outcome is fairly
224. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam).
225. Flanders, supra note 104, at 119.
226. See generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 47-50 (1994) (describing the "paradox of voter turnout").
227. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 60, at 1752.
228. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000). For a discussion of why the
analogy with campaign finance is at best imperfect, see supra Part III.B.3.
229. GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 226, at 47.
230. Id.
231. See generally FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS STILL
DON'T VOTE AND WHY POLITICIANS WANT IT THAT WAY 24-25 (2000) (describing the "legal-




insignificant, fear of fraud is unlikely to stop them. A vote amidst
heavy incidence of fraud is still worth more than no vote at all. Voting
may hold a non-instrumental value: some people simply enjoy the act
of voting. Alternatively, voting may supply an instrumental benefit
aside from influencing the outcome of the particular election in which
it is cast. People vote out of a sense of civic duty or to "affirm their
partisan identity."232 They may wish to signal to their friends and
neighbors that they are committed, engaged citizens or to avoid
having to admit to those friends that they failed to vote.233 Such voters
derive satisfaction from the sense of "affirmation and compliance" that
voting bestows. 23 4
The self-interested conduct of political actors provides further
evidence that the correlation may not exist. In the heat of the 2008
presidential election, the campaign of Republican nominee John
McCain made frequent reference to allegedly massive voter
registration fraud on the part of the organization Association of
Community Organizers for Reform Now ("ACORN"). In the final
presidential debate, Senator McCain warned that ACORN was "now
on the verge of maybe perpetrating one of the greatest frauds in voter
history."235 If Republicans, who are often the strongest supporters of
photo ID laws, 236 truly believed that fear of fraud would drive
legitimate voters away from the polls, they would seem to lack any
incentive to spend so much time talking about voter fraud. The
ACORN charge was often repeated at Republican rallies to supporters
whom Republicans had the greatest incentive to convince to go to the
polls. 237 Former Republican strategist Allen Raymond explained this
conduct by positing that fear of voter fraud actually "gins up the base"
and that the purpose of raising the issue "is to potentially, maybe,
sway some undecided voters in swing states."238 Rather than give up
232. GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 226, at 67.
233. Id. at 51.
234. Id.
235. Senator John McCain, Third Presidential Debate (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.debates.
org/pages/trans2008d.html.
236. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623 & n.21 (2008)
(observing that, in the vote on Indiana's photo ID law, "all of the Republicans in the General
Assembly voted in favor .. .and the Democrats were unanimous in opposing it"); Hasen, supra
note 141, at 19 (explaining that every state legislature that has tightened ID requirements post-
2000 was dominated by Republicans).
237. E.g., Larry Eichel, Palin Defends Attacks on Obama over ACORN, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Oct. 19, 2008, at A5 (describing an ominous depiction of ACORN at a political rally).
238. Countdown with Keith Olbermann (MSNBC television broadcast Oct. 14, 2008).
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on the process, voters who fear that fraudulent votes are being cast
may mobilize in greater numbers in order to counteract such fraud.
b. Empirical Analysis
Whether the correlation between fear and turnout exists is a
difficult question to answer in the abstract, since either result is
conceivable and can find some theoretical support. However, the
question need not be considered solely in the abstract, as it can be
tested empirically. Indeed, two recent studies addressed the issue.23 9
Professors Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily's
survey measured each participant's perceptions of the frequency of
voter fraud generally and voter impersonation specifically. 240 Each
participant was then asked whether he had voted in the 2006 midterm
elections and whether he intended to vote in the 2008 presidential
election; the authors also measured actual 2006 turnout based on
voting records. 241 When these two factors were compared, the
correlation between perception of fraud and turnout proved "extremely
weak and almost always statistically insignificant."242 For instance, 80
percent of participants who believed voter impersonation occurred
very or somewhat often intended to vote in the 2008 election. 243
Participants who believed that such fraud occurred rarely or very
rarely reported an average intent to vote at a similar rate of 82
percent. 244 Similarly, the actual turnout rates in 2006 of participants
who thought fraud occurred very frequently, occasionally,
infrequently, and almost never were nearly equal.245
Professors R. Michael Alvarez and Thad Hall reached a similar
conclusion in their survey of public perceptions of threats to election
security. When they compared the responses of individuals who voted
in 2004 with individuals who did not vote, they found that the
239. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 60, at 1739; R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall,
Measuring Perceptions of Election Threats: Survey Data from Voters and Elites, in ELECTION
FRAUD: DETECTING AND DETERRING ELECTORAL MANIPULATION 71, 78-82 (R. Michael Alvarez et
al. eds., 2008).
240. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 60, at 1744.
241. Id. at 1750.
242. Id. at 1751.
243. Id. at 1754 tbl.3. While self-reported intent to vote is often unreliable as a prediction of
actual turnout, it nonetheless serves as a measure of "psychological attachment to the process
and interest in electoral politics." Id. at 1751.
244. Id. at 1754 tbl.3.




nonvoters were actually less concerned about fraud.246 They concluded
that the numbers "strongly suggest that nonvoters are not being kept
from the polls because of a concern about election fraud."247 While
presenting the results of just two surveys, these studies demonstrate
that the relevant evidence can be compiled and submitted to a court
for consideration.
D. A Word on Tailoring
Determining whether fear of fraud is real, reasonable, and
correlated with a harm such as decreased turnout helps define the
strength of the state's interest in addressing that fear. These
determinations are not the end of the story, of course. The absence of
these factors will not necessarily lead to invalidation of the law, and
their presence will not necessarily save it. Even if these three factors
are met and the court deems the state interest compelling, Burdick
directs the court to balance the interest the law serves against the
burden it places on the right to vote, considering the degree to which
the former makes the latter necessary. 248 Courts make such an
evaluation through the traditional narrowly tailored analysis of strict
scrutiny.249
The tailoring analysis must address a particularly intriguing
issue if a correlation between fear and turnout exists. If the state has
a compelling interest in voter participation, that interest must extend
to all legitimate voters. Thus, the reviewing court must determine
whether the burden a photo ID law would place on the participation of
one set of voters is necessary to serve the state's compelling interest in
the participation of other voters. One important consideration in this
analysis is the fact that non-participation by fearful voters is not the
result of state action. Some commentators argue that the courts
should defer to states to make this judgment. 250 As legislators are
necessarily self-interested in getting certain groups to vote and other
groups not to vote, the risk posed by deference is too great. Just as
courts must thoroughly examine whether the photo ID law serves a
246. Alvarez & Hall, supra note 239, at 82.
247. Id.
248. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 789 (1983)).
249. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
250. E.g., DeLaney, supra note 60, at 874-75; cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003)
(approving, in the campaign finance context, "deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing
constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise').
2009] 1909
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
compelling interest, so too must courts carefully analyze whether the
law is indeed necessary to serve that interest.
V. CONCLUSION
President Roosevelt's words do echo in the voter fraud context,
but not in the way proponents of restrictive voting requirements might
claim. Society does have reason to fear fear: the government's use of
fear to restrict rights, especially fundamental rights like the franchise.
By signaling in Purcell and Crawford that it was willing to accept the
state's interest in addressing fear of fraud, the Court was derelict in
its duty to protect the right to vote. Courts have failed to articulate
why fear is a harm that must be addressed and why abridging the
right to vote is necessary to serve that purpose. When a challenge to a
fear-based photo ID law successfully triggers heightened scrutiny, the
courts must have an analytical framework to evaluate its validity. In
order to determine the strength of the state's interest in addressing
fear of fraud, courts should, at least, ask if the fear is real, if it is
reasonable under the circumstances of the jurisdiction, and if it
correlates with an independently recognized harm such as non-
participation. This framework presents an appropriately exacting
standard for the state to meet, since the right to vote in its purest
form is at stake.
If the majority can strip the minority of rights simply by
reference to fear, then the foundations of democracy are undermined.
Such reasoning lacks a logical stopping point, enabling the state to
pass increasingly restrictive voting requirements as long as some
percentage of the voting population harbors a crisis of confidence in
the electoral system.
The promise of democracy carries with it the risk of
uncertainty. Experiences from the past three election cycles, from
hanging chads in Florida to an eight-month-long U.S. Senate election
in Minnesota, show that the current American electoral system is
imperfect. Yet discomfort with imperfection, including fear of voter
fraud, seems a small price to pay for the freedom to choose one's
leaders. Even if the exclusion of some voters from the political process
addresses fear of fraud in the short-run, it ultimately works to
undermine the legitimacy of representative government by ensuring
that certain voices are not represented. Without the right to vote,
individuals who lack photo ID are unable to register their preferences
on important policy issues, including the necessity of voting
restrictions like photo ID laws. The debate over the appropriate
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balance between ballot access and ballot security is ongoing, and, like
any debate in a democratic nation, it requires the input of the full
range of the citizenry.
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